(3) The perps used a legitimate, and scary powerful tool called RWEverything. This is new to me, but the nub of the matter is that it is a legitimately signed driver that, seemingly, can read or write everything in firmware. This is obviously powerful, and cool, as long as it is used for good.(4) So far, we have not found an exact match for the samples in their report in our collection, but we have _many_ variants of Lo Jack. They may be all innocent, or … maybe not. We are still looking and thinking. (5) We still have six variants of the Lenovo rootkit, that no one detects (well, one product detects one variant, but that’s approaching zero from a stats perspective… one out of 360). This may/probably mean they are extinct, or ... maybe not… (6) Interestingly, the modus operandi of the Lenovo rootkit and the modified Lo Jacks, are _remarkably_ similar. This might be pure coincidence… or … maybe something else. Bottom line is that we have many variants of Computrace/Lo Jack that need to be examined, and many Lenovo rootkit variants that need to be examined. And we have other things that look suspicious.
It would be really helpful to get more firmware samples, and it's geeky, but some How To instructions can be found here
All this, combined with what we have found about certificates being expired, or marked "Do not trust", or "Do not ship", which you can read about here suggests to me that we are on dangerous, shaky, and new, ground.Stay tuned.